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Every two years, American politics gives its signature performance: nationwide elections.
The spectacularization of politics has produced multi-million industries born out of thin air
to influence, explain and predict the vote. Recent elections have witnessed a staggering rise
in the popularity of “trial-heat” polls as the standard prediction measure of election-day
voter behaviour, with the number of polls conducted and available to the public increasing
by over 900% since 1989. At the same time, models based on structural economic conditions
have had remarkable success in predicting Presidential elections, with Alan Abramowitzs
“Time for Change” (TFC) model famously achieving margins of error as low as 1.5 percent-
age points [1].
Modelling Senate elections, however, poses two main problems: the relatively low num-
ber of polls per state, leading to potential higher impact of the “house effect” [4] (favouring
one side, depending on the polling house) and lower relevance of the economy. The former
is endemic of mid-term elections: the stakes are perceived (maybe erroneously) to be lower
and coverage by pundits and pollsters is thus reduced. The effect of the economy is weaker
due to the lack of precise “blame” to be directed at the incumbent [2]. Whilst the President
is considered to be responsible and hence heavily rewarded or penalised for the economic
conditions, the same cannot be said for a Senator; thus, models such as the TFC are less
relevant at the state level.
With the aim of analysing the 2014 Senate elections, we extended a modelling framework
developed for the 2012 Presidential election [6]. The model is based on the integration of
different sources of evidence to account for both the long- (e.g. the economic conditions) and
the short-term effects (e.g. swings in the voters mood, mainly accounted for by the polls) —
see Figure 1.
We model the Republican two-party vote share depending on a state-level effect captur-
ing the performance of individual candidates and a national effect capturing the campaign
effect. Technically, each effect is modelled using a reverse-random walk, where on election
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Figure 1: A graphical description of the model; for each state and week, the probability
of a Republican win is informed by the observed polls and depends on the state-level and
the campaign effects. These are modelled to account for the temporal correlation, with
the values in the current week influencing the next ones. At election week, the campaign
effect is assumed to wane at 0, while the state-level effect reverts to the long-term structural
predictions.
day the state-level and the campaign effects are anchored at the structural forecast (a state-
specific version of the TFC) and 0, respectively. Anchoring the state-level at 0 on election
day encodes our belief that, at the end of the campaign, the candidates’ efforts will become
superfluous as most voters will have already made their mind up by that time.
Consequently, our forecast for election day will be some sort of compromise between the
most recent polls and the historical predictions. When fitting the model close to the election
week, the campaign effect will be already close to 0 and the state effect will not have much
time to revert back to the historical forecast.Thus, the Republican election day two-party
vote share will be determined largely by the polls. Conversely, when fitting the model months
away from election day, the Republican share is largely determined by the structural forecast.
Because of the random walk specification, older polls are discounted in weight, but they
leave behind their historical estimates of the state and campaign effects. This is interesting
as it allows us to look at how voters behaviour evolved during the campaign. By comparing
state and national effects we can assess how much this was due to campaign factors.
Figure 2 shows an overview of our model’s performance. Out of the 33 races we monitor
(excluding the uncontested Alabama race and the special elections in South Carolina and
Oklahoma), only the forecast for North Carolina was on the wrong side of the 50% vote
share line, suggesting that the model does a good job at predicting the “sign” of the election.
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However, in key competitive races such as Virginia, Louisiana, Kentucky, Kansas, Georgia
and Arkansas, the Republican vote share was under-estimated. We will see this was due to
a skew in the polls, which led some of the predictions astray.
According to our model, the predicted probability of a Republican senate takeover was
94% by the end of election week. The most probable outcome is a Republican win of 19 seats
— or a net gain of 7 seats, 1 more than they need to take over the Senate. The model as-
signs Harry Reid, the Democratic Senate majority leader, only a 6% chance of keeping his job.
In fact, the Republicans had a net gain of 81 seats, winning a total of 20 seats, which
was rather improbable under our model.
A potential reason for such an under-estimation is perhaps that polls were heavily skewed
in favour of the democrats [8]. As shown by Nate Silver on fivethirtyeight.com [13],
polls bias is actually rather common and random, on average [11]. Sam Wang, at the
Princeton Election Consortium, suggests an interesting hypothesis: polls were biased be-
cause Democrats did not turn up for the mid-terms. This is in line with political pundits,
who argue that the “Obama coalition” does not turn up when the current President is not
on the ballot [9].
We compared our results to other models using the Brier Score, a measure of accuracy for
predictions of mutually exclusive, categorical outcomes [3], generally regarded as the stan-
dard in evaluating election predictions. Table 1 shows a ranking of predictors, as calculated
by Sam Wang 2 and The Washington Post.
For our model, the computed Brier Score is 0.031, that is in the top 3. This is consistent
with Figure 2, where the direction of the red wave was well captured.
Further research could focus on expanding our hierarchical specification to also include
regional effects, such as a “South”, “Great Lakes” or a “New England” effect on the Re-
publican vote. The formal specification of appropriate distributions for these regional effects
could help model common trends in regional voting blocks and give better prediction inter-
vals. Other tweaks can be made to the distribution of the polling data and the structural
forecast, to include third party candidates and independents. This would have been useful
to avoid wrong estimations such as those made in the North Carolina race.
1The Louisiana “Jungle Primary” was modelled as a one off race between Democratic incumbent Senator
Landrieu and the highest polling Republican contender, Bill Cassidy. At a later date, Cassidy defeated
Landrieu in a run-off election to give the Republicans a total net gain of 9 seats.
2Sam Wang used a different scale from other predictors to evaluate his Brier Scores. Although on a
different scale, it is reassuring to see that the ranking is consistent between the two columns.
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Brier Score Calculations
Washington Post Sam Wang (PEC)
Daily Kos 0.024 Daily Kos 0.10
Washington Post 0.027 Washington Post 0.12
FiveThirtyEight 0.032 FiveThirtyEight 0.14
PredictWise 0.032 Betfair 0.14
Huff. Post 0.034 Huff. Post 0.14
Upshot 0.035 Upshot 0.15
Princeton 0.043 Princeton 0.18
Table 1: Ranking of pollsters by Brier Score, a measure of prediction accuracy. Our model
would be third in the rankings as calculated by Sam Wang, worse than the Washington Post
but better than fivethirtyeight.com. Drew Linzer, at the Daily Kos, takes gold again [5].
Elections are not random phenomena, but rather an expression of specific governing dy-
namics, which we can understand, explain and, eventually, engineer, at least to some extent.
Whilst this is a frightening prospect for the future democracy, it promises to be an inex-
haustible source of inspiration for the next generation of statisticians.
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Figure 2: We compare the predicted two-party vote share distribution with the actual results.
The prediction interval is reported as 2 s.d. around the predicted mean Republican vote
share. A safe Republican seat is coloured red and is defined as the mean being at least 2
s.d. greater than the 0.5 cut-off; a likely Republican seat is coloured light red and is defined
when the mean is larger than the 0.5 cut-off, but the lower tail touches the line. Democratic
seats are defined in the same way, with a blue colour scale. The left axis contains the initials
of the state in question and the initial of the incumbent party.
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